Introduction
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, regulators across the world have concentrated on mitigating systemic risks. Systemic risk happens when one institution's failure spreads to related agents or markets through financial transactions or financial linkages. Such crises impose large costs on the taxpayer because regulators are forced to rescue the failed institutions. Short-selling bans were used by regulators during the Global Financial Crisis to prevent market panics. These bans were imposed at times in which falling stock markets and great distress in financial institutions were severely undermining investors' confidence and worrying regulators and politicians. The bans aimed at stopping "bear raids". In a "bear raid", many traders short sell large amounts of a firm's stock, forcing the price down. For the price manipulation to be profitable, the short-sellers need to generate panic and a lack of confidence amongst investors and other firm counterparties. As a result, the initial drop in price impacts the fundamentals of the firm, which generates a feedback effect that further increases pressure on the share price.
The first ban was imposed on 19 th September 2008 in the US and the UK to respond to the panic generated by the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market. Most countries followed these actions and introduced bans shortly afterwards (Gruenewald, et al., 2010) . The European sovereign debt crisis, which affected European banks' funding costs (especially short-term interbank costs) in various ways (BIS 2011) , persuaded a group of regulators (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain) to coordinate another ban on August 11 th 2011. In both cases, regulators defended the need for short selling restrictions by referring to the herding behaviour of short sellers, driven by their negative view of financial institutions. Such herding could potentially also affect fundamentally sound institutions by putting downward pressure on share prices.
The stability of the financial industry rests on public confidence, and the industry is vulnerable to "panic runs". Because stock prices are forward looking, falling share prices affect the confidence of current and future creditors and investors, thus further supporting a lower valuation because institutions with low capital run a greater risk of default. Decreases in these institutions' stock prices reduce their ability to raise more capital and force the inefficient liquidation of assets, which further weakens stock prices. Acharya et al. (2012) highlight the contribution of excessive leverage in propagating a crisis. When aggregate capital is low, there are no healthy financial firms able to buy or cover the functions of other insolvent institutions. Firms with very low capital levels will generate the highest systemic risk when the financial sector as a whole is low in capital because no other firm in the system can assume their liabilities. In this sense, financial institutions with the lowest capital buffers would be the most vulnerable to the type of price manipulation some attribute to short sellers, and abusive short-selling could potentially increase the volatility and contagion risk of financial institutions.
Recent research on the short sale restrictions imposed during the financial crisis has looked at the consequences of the ban on stock liquidity, price discovery, and returns 1 . Most research finds that bans have a negative effect on stock markets, but that is not surprising if one thinks of the bans as similar to a suspension of convertibility to prevent a bank run 2 . The suspension breaks the terms of the deposit contract, but it gives banks space to restore liquidity and regain the depositor's confidence. This study adds to this body of research by exploring the bans from a perspective of financial stability. The focus is on the factors that drove market regulators to impose the short-selling bans and whether the bans were preventing a larger systemic crisis. If the bans on short-selling have some temporary negative impact on market liquidity or efficiency, the impact is likely to be less expensive than the cost of rescuing one or more financial institutions.
This study makes two major contributions to the literature. First, it tries to determine whether short-sellers were targeting the financial institutions with the highest leverage. Second, it analyses whether short-selling increases institutions' individual and systemic risks 3 . The results show that changes in both univariate and contagion risks are positively related with changes in short-selling positions. The results also show that low capital adequacy ratios for banks (or higher leverage for insurance companies) tend to correspond with larger short positions. 1 See next section for a literature review.
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The paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the literature and the context of the bans, section 3 estimates the relationship between short selling and financial institutions' risks, section 4 analyses the relationship between short-selling and institutions' capital, and section 5 concludes.
Short-Selling and Price Manipulation.
Just before the GFC, short-selling was generally permitted around the world 4 . Certain activities around short selling, such as disseminating false rumours to depress the price of shorted stocks or the use of trading strategies aimed at "pummelling" stock prices and undermining the confidence of long-position holders, were already illegal 5 . This type of market abuse, aimed at destabilising financial institutions' stocks with the intention to profit from the downward spiral of prices is the primary reason for the short-selling bans of the GFC.
The financial and economic press is full of recounts of cases in which CEOs complain about the damaging effect of short selling (which some also regard as immoral because short-sellers benefit from somebody else's losses). Prominent voices in the finance world, such as George Soros, have expressed negative views on their activities. Others, such as Misra et al. (2012) , provide detailed evidence of a bear raid, in their case against Citigroup's stock in November 2007. Some members of the financial press have also blamed aggressive short-sellers for precipitating the fall of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
The recent literature analyses the likelihood of feedback effects from stock prices on fundamentals. For example, Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) argue that a firm's stock price affects how its counterparties (e.g., creditors, investors, suppliers, clients) view the firm. This view will influence their decisions regarding the firm, which in turn will have an effect on the firm's cash-flow and fundamental valuation. Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008) go one step further and 4 With some exceptions regarding naked short selling (selling short without ever securing the stock) and some versions of the "uptick rule" (short sales are only permitted on an upward movement of the stock price, i.e., at a price that is higher than the preceding price). The "uptick rule" was eliminated in 2007 in the US. 5 For an explanation of these trading strategies see Duffy (2008) . model the possible coordination of aggregate investors in the presence of feedback effects.
Investors realise it is best to buy when everybody is buying, or to sell when everybody is selling.
A natural extension to feedback effects is to look at price manipulation and to examine the possible use of short-selling to de-stabilise prices in such a way that it benefits trading strategies that are initiated by short-sellers.
Of particular relevance to this study are the works of Oehmke (2013) and Liu (2010) . Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) develop a model in which financial institutions are susceptible to "predatory" short-selling and provide a theoretical argument to justify the shortselling bans. Financial institutions are subject to capital requirements to limit their leverage.
Through their aggressive trading, short sellers may cause banks to violate these requirements (especially when financial institutions are near their maximum permitted level of leverage) and force them to sell long-term assets at discounted values to improve their capital positions. These sales further depress the stock values and render the short-seller positions profitable. This effect is more relevant during periods in which financial institutions have weak balance-sheets because short-sellers can trigger the total unwinding of financial institutions' long-term investments merely by short-selling their stock. In the absence of short-selling, the financial institutions would have met their leverage constraints and would not have been forced into inefficient liquidation. Coordination amongst short-sellers who can see each other's positions is decisive in bringing down a financial institution. Recent regulatory changes to promote market transparency thus facilitate the short-traders' strategies. Liu (2010) builds a model in which short-selling can also cause the failure of a sound bank, especially if the bank has weak fundamentals and severe maturity mismatches. The mechanism in this case is imperfect information about fundamentals combined with market illiquidity. If the market is illiquid, short-sellers can influence and dampen the stock price; the asymmetric information forces creditors to use the banks' stock to learn about fundamentals; and the uncertainty and low stock price increase the downside risk of creditors, leading to a reduction in debt value, which in turn may cause creditors to run and eventually lead to the bank's failure. In this setting, short-selling can also generate systemic risk when the fall of one or more institutions causes a negative externality (decrease in confidence) to other banks by reducing the fundamentals of other banks. In an extreme case, even healthy banks will become weaker. This would trigger a new round of short-selling that can cause a cycle in which many financial institutions collapse.
Other research looks at short selling strategies non-specific to financial institutions. For instance, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) model "predatory trading" practices as trading strategies for which the aim is to withdraw liquidity from the market when it is most needed, causing prices to overshoot and even forcing large investors to liquidate their positions. Predatory traders would sell when large investors need to sell and thus increase the illiquidity of the market, leading prices to deviate from their fundamentals. Such traders anticipate the order flow. They take short positions and trade in the same direction as the troubled investor to benefit from the ensuing price swings. The profits, and therefore, the incentives to engage in predatory trading, are larger during a financial crisis because the price swings and the crisis will be further amplified by "panic" selling by vulnerable investors. Moreover, the continuous drop in stock prices will affect the wealth of other investors who will have to keep selling, thus depressing prices more. Goldstein and Guembel (2008) develop a model in which feedback effects between the financial markets and the real value of firms may motivate firms to bypass valuable investment opportunities and cause an inefficient allocation of resources. Traders who can anticipate this have an incentive to short sell the stock of a firm and drive the price down with additional sell orders. The drop in stock price pushes the firm to cancel the valuable investment project and further reduces the value of the firm. This will allow the trader to generate profits from the short position. Shkilko et al. (2012) argue that short sellers try to influence intraday returns to cause negative price overreactions and extreme return reversals (indicative of predatory trading) in intraday trading. They also report that aggressive short-selling makes markets more illiquid. Bocher et al. (2008) argue that hedge funds have an incentive to manipulate "end of the day returns" and "year-end" returns to influence compensation. They find significant increases in short selling volume at the end of these periods and lower returns for stocks in which hedge funds hold large short positions. Henry and Koski (2010) find evidence of price manipulation by short-sellers around the issue date of "seasoned equity offers" (SEO): short sellers will try to lower the offer price to profit by covering their short position at a lower price. Khanna and Mathews (2012) model bear raids in which the firm under attack has large blockholders who will try to battle the price manipulation driven by short-sellers. Under certain circumstances it would be too costly for the blockholders to continue defending the stock, and regulatory intervention would be required to restore prices to fundamental values.
This study is also related to recent literature that examines the short-selling bans of 2008 6 , particularly the effects of those restrictions on market liquidity and efficiency. The majority of this literature concludes that short-selling bans have been damaging to stock markets. Of special concern was the effect of the ban on liquidity when market participants were already suffering illiquidity from other markets as a consequence of the GFC. Beber and Pagano (2013) conclude that the bans reduced liquidity and price efficiency across 30 countries; furthermore, financial institutions' stock prices continue the downward price spirals after the ban. Boehmer et al. (2013) find that the ban triggered a significant drop in shorting activity in the NYSE and NASDAQ markets and that liquidity was negatively affected. Autore et al. (2011) report a similar illiquidity shock as a consequence of the ban and a valuation reversal for banned stocks as predicted by Miller (1977) . Marsh and Payne (2012) describe a drop in market liquidity and increase in trading costs for the UK market during the ban period. Battalio et al. (2011) investigate whether the decline of US financial stock prices was amplified by short-sellers. They find no relationship between short-selling activity and the drop in prices.
Testable Hypotheses
Given the previous theoretical and empirical literature, this study tests two hypotheses regarding these bans:
First, short selling increases financial institutions' individual and systemic risk; consequently, at times of market disruption a ban on short selling these institutions' stocks may prevent greater systemic events from taking place.
Second, short sellers target institutions with lower capital buffers because their trading strategy is likely to be more successful at affecting investors' confidence and generating panic selling (and a downward price spiral) for such institutions.
The relationship Between Short-Selling and Financial Institutions Risk

Methodology
Individual or univariate (VaR) risk is the likelihood of large negative returns in a stock, and systemic risk or multivariate (VaR) risk is the likelihood that a large negative return in a bank's stock coincides with a large drop in another bank's stock; both are estimated using Extreme Value Theory (EVT). EVT can be used to analyse extremely rare (low probability) events and how they spread across financial institutions and markets. The prevention of such extreme events is what regulators are aiming for when imposing short selling bans because of their significant effects on the financial system and the real economy. The non-parametric EVT-metrics are based on Hartmann et al. (2004) and Straetmans et al. (2008) . Please see Pais and Stork (2011) and Appendix A in this study for a detailed description of the EVT methodological framework and for recent applications.
Data Description
Daily total return indices for financial institutions in France, Italy, and Spain were obtained from 7 Belgium also banned short selling of financial institutions' stocks on the same date, but was left out of the dataset because of the small size of the Belgium market.
The short-selling data were obtained from Markit Securities Finance. This company captures "stock loan trading information from over 100 participants and approximately 85% of the OTC securities lending market" (Data Explorers, 2011) . The data contain information on short positions down to the individual security level. We use their own metric, 'utilisation' (or utilisation rate), which indicates the value of a stock being utilised for securities lending against the total value of inventory available for lending. In this study, we refer to this metric as the 'relative short position'. The metric is calculated as follows:
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The above calculation results in a percentage that ranges between 0% and 100%. We include only the wholesale lending side in the calculation. We use only Record Type 1 (e.g., all dividends) and limit the data to utilisation rates from the local markets. These daily utilisation rates per financial institution are then averaged. Averaging the short positions makes them more stable and, as a result, less dependent on day-to-day market fluctuations, which are not very informative. Averaging also removes the effects of short selling positions held for very short periods of time by market-makers providing liquidity to the markets. The use of average utilisation rates matches well our risk metrics, which also correspond to longer periods rather than specific days. The risk and utilisation metrics thus reflect period-averages rather than daily observations. As an illustration, see below the daily utilisation rates of two financial institutions for the five calendar months analysed.
<<<< PLACE FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE >>>> Next, we test our first hypothesis: is there a relationship between short positions and risk levels? Again, similar to the results in Figure 2 , we obtain conflicting results: positive for France, nonexistent for Italy and negative for Spain.
Empirical Results
To further analyse this matter, we also calculate the relationship between the first differences of both VaR-levels and short positions over time. negative. Overall, Figure 3 .B. presents inconclusive evidence of the existence of a positive relationship between changes in VaR-levels and changes in short positions.
Next, we shift our focus from univariate to multivariate risk calculations. Lastly, as a further robustness test, we changed our systemic risk calculation methodology from assessing intra-country risks to inter-country risks. All systemic risk calculations in this study so far have been based on conditional-co-crash probabilities of financial institutions that are listed on the same exchange. However, such contagion interdependencies also exist between different exchanges, especially within the European Union. Hence, we re-calculated the systemic risks using this adjusted measure, thus using average conditional-co-crash probabilities of financial institutions that are listed on different exchanges. For sake of space, we do not report the results.
We find that our conclusions are largely unaffected, albeit slightly weakened. We interpret the outcomes of this robustness test as support for the findings reported.
Capital Requirements and Short-Selling
Capital is needed by banks to perform their basic financial intermediation function because a bank may only lend if it meets the capital requirements for each asset it originates. During crises, financial institutions will experience more asset write downs (which are deducted from capital) and may fail to maintain minimum capital ratios, which can lead to a failure (and potential contagion) unless some other investor or the government steps in. The GFC caused major losses for many financial institutions, led to several bankruptcies and forced the restructuring of many US and European banks, which included injections of public capital. This generated a crisis of confidence, as seen in the 2008 runs on wholesale debt markets. As liquidity problems grew, banks had to liquidate assets to meet capital requirements.
In this section, we test our second hypothesis. Short-selling bans are imposed by regulators trying to reduce systemic risk. Therefore, it is a great concern for regulators when short-sellers target financial institutions with the lowest capital buffers, especially in times of crisis. Acharya et al (2012) highlight the contribution of excessive leverage in propagating a crisis, where a financial institution is unable to perform its intermediary function when the value of its equity falls to a sufficiently small fraction of its outstanding liabilities. In good times, a troubled institution may be able to raise new capital, be bought by another institution or face an orderly bankruptcy. However, when aggregate capital (in the financial industry) is low, there are no healthy financial firms able to buy or cover the functions of the insolvent institution, and the consequences of the capital shortage will be felt throughout the financial and real sectors. The government will face the costs of rescuing the failed institutions to prevent a systemic crisis.
Consequently, Acharya et al (2012) argue that systemically risky financial institutions are likely to face a large capital shortfall just when the financial sector itself is under distress because no other firm in the system can assume their liabilities. Thus, institutions with very low capital levels will generate the highest systemic risk when the financial sector as a whole is low in capital.
Recall also the models of Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) and Liu (2010) , in which shortsellers prefer to target financial institutions with weaker capital positions or higher leverage because of the higher likelihood of being successful in their price manipulation. Drops in the stock prices triggered by short-sellers will generate a crisis of confidence amongst creditors and investors, which will feedback into the fundamental value of the institution, thereby selfvalidating the lower valuations. Likewise, institutions with low capital buffers and asset losses will find themselves forced into the inefficient liquidation of long-term assets because raising new capital on these circumstance would be too costly; short-sellers aware of this will put further pressure on these institutions and force them to their total unwinding. Banks with low capital requirements are also more exposed to extreme shocks, especially at times of crisis (De Jonghe, 2010). , this bank had a ratio equal to 26.22 per cent, far above regulatory requirements and much 10 We estimate financial institutions' capital buffer as the average of their capital ratio at the end of the previous year and their capital ratio at the end of the current year. As a robustness test, we also ran all calculations in this section with forward-and backward-looking numbers and, thus, with only end-of-previous-year and end-of-currentyear buffers. The results do not change materially, and the conclusions are unaffected.
higher than any of its peers in our sample. As a robustness test, we removed several such 'outliers'. Our previous conclusions are unaffected, and the relationship between the capital adequacy ratio and relative short position remains strongly negative. Next, we move to nonbanks, for which the capital adequacy figures are unavailable. Another metric that reflects the level of leverage of financial institutions is total debt as a percentage of total capital. A higher value of this variable indicates more leverage. This leverage-metric thus has a function opposite that of the capital adequacy ratio used for banks, where a higher value indicates lower leverage.
The bottom panel of Figure 6 .A. shows that the relationship between this leverage metric and the short selling levels is positive. The upward sloping trend line in the bottom panel indicates that short selling tends to increase with the level of non-bank financial institutions' leverage as well.
A more detailed analysis of the data reveals that April Group was the financial institution with the lowest leverage. In 2010, its debt as a percentage of total capital equalled only 5.48%; by 2011, this ratio had fallen to 4.25%. In both years, the relative short positions were very low as well, at 0.34% and 3.30%, respectively. On the other hand, we also find that in some cases very low short positions correspond to financial institutions for which the leverage is much higher. In .C., which shows non-bank financial institutions, confirms the previous results. In four of the five time periods, we find that short positions tend to be higher for insurers with lower capital buffers, although in June 2008 the relationship appears to be zero. These results support the notion that, over time, the weaker insurers are being targeted by short sellers.
Conclusion
Regulators need to balance the positive effects of short selling in market efficiency and liquidity with its negative effects on market prices at times of market instability. This need is more pressing when ensuring the stability of financial institutions. Banning short-selling cannot make banks' risks disappear or their returns turn instantly positive. However, if short-sellers cause prices to fall beyond their fundamental value and amplify market crashes, increasing the fragility and systemic risks of financial institutions, a ban of short-selling in a time of crisis is justified.
The academic literature usually regards short selling as instrumental to market efficiency and beneficial for price discovery. However, the general public and CEOs (who frequently blame short-sellers for falling stock prices) tend to consider it a damaging form of trading. Regulators have occasionally taken this view and have introduced mechanisms to restrict short-selling. This study looks at the factors that drove market regulators to impose the short-selling bans on financial institutions' stocks during the Global Financial Crisis. Of special interest is determining whether the bans prevented a larger systemic crisis. If the bans on short-selling cause a temporary disruption of market liquidity or efficiency, the impact is likely to be less expensive than the cost of rescuing one or more financial institutions.
This study tests two hypotheses regarding short selling bans and the risks of financial institutions. First, it analyses whether short-selling increases institutions' individual and systemic risks. Second, it tries to determine whether short-sellers were targeting the most undercapitalised institutions because the downward price pressure is more likely to result in profits when the institutions under attack have the lowest capital ratios. The paper uses EVT to estimate the effect of short selling on the individual and systemic risk of financial institutions in three European countries (France, Italy and Spain). These three countries were the target of a short-selling ban imposed in August 2011.
Regulators argue that short-sellers deliberately drive down the prices of financial institutions' stocks beyond fundamental values to generate panic selling and further depress prices. A decrease in the market value of a bank's stock price affects the confidence of current and future creditors and investors and the institution's ability to raise more capital and debt, increasing leverage and thus negatively affecting its stock price even further. This strategy renders large profits from closing the short position at a lower price. At the same time, however, it may destabilise the market if it increases contagion risks across the financial industry.
Our results show that there is a positive relationship between daily changes in short-selling volume and daily changes in both univariate and systemic risks for institutions in the ban countries. This relationship is stronger for short-selling and systemic risk, which gives support to regulatory actions aimed at preventing systemic crises. The results also show that lower capital adequacy ratios for banks (or higher leverage for insurance companies) tend to correspond with larger short positions.
These results are comparable to other findings that short selling can at times amplify market crashes and can be an instrument for price manipulation. Feedback effects between market prices and real investment decisions heighten the vulnerability of the financial system, particularly for financial institutions that have to meet capital requirements and depend on public confidence.
The recent financial crisis stresses the need to properly measure and understand banking crises and systemic risk because events that increase these risks impose high welfare costs on the economy. Regulators have been broadly criticised because short-selling bans can potentially affect market efficiency. However, the repercussion of the bans on market efficiency is only one piece of the impact of such regulatory actions: the large costs of bailing out one or more banks are a greater worry for regulators. If short-sellers cause prices to fall beyond fundamentals and increase the probability of a bank crashing and/or the contagion risks between financial institutions, then a ban of short-selling at times of crisis could be justified. 
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Change in Systemic Risk
Change in Relative Short Position Table 3 documents, for each of the 45 financial institutions in the sample, estimates of the systemic risk levels. The starting date is 17 April 2001. For each financial institution, conditional-co-crash (CCC) probability estimates are averaged across all financial institutions that are listed on the same exchange. The CCC probability estimates are calculated for the middle trading day of the calendar month, as
